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Union of Egoists

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-Kevin I. Slaughter

What is a UnionOfEgoists.com?

This is an informational resource provided by Kevin I. Slaughter of Underworld Amusements and Trevor Blake of OVO, initiated in February and publicly launched April 1st of 2016. The website initially focuses on providing historical, biographical and bibliographical details of a few their favorite Egoist philosophers. It is also integrating the archives of egoist website i-studies.com, the former project of Svein Olav Nyberg, and the EgoistArchives.com project of Dan Davies. Further, it will be home to Der Geist, a Journal of Egoism in print 1845 – 1945. UnionOfEgoists.com will be the best resource for Egoism online.

What is a Union of Egoists?

"We two, the State and I, are enemies. I, the egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this "human society," I sacrifice nothing to it, I only utilize it; but to be able to utilize it completely I transform it rather into my property and my creature; i. e., I annihilate it, and form in its place the Union of Egoists."

- Max Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own*

What is Egoism?

"Egoism is the claim that the Individual is the measure of all things. In ethics, in epistemology, in aesthetics, in society, the Individual is the best and only arbitrator. Egoism claims social convention, laws, other people, religion, language, time and all other forces outside of the Individual are an impediment to the liberty and existence of the Individual. Such impediments may be tolerated but they have no special standing to the Individual, who may elect to ignore or subvert or destroy them as He can. In egoism the State has no monopoly to take tax or to wage war."

-Trevor Blake, *Confessions of a Failed Egoist*

MINUS ONE

MAX STIRNER
JOSIAH WARREN
JAMES L. WALKER
RENZO NOVATORE
JOHN HENRY MACKEY
E. ARMONO
ALEXANDER LIANEAS
MARIANA RUSAZHNIK
LYSANDER SPOONER
RALPH REDGERARD

№ 32
1973

EDITOR Sid Parker



ARTHUR MOYSES

0355

EN MARGE

S.E.Parker

(a!)

On another page I mention the "European tradition" of anarchist individualism and its pessimistic tendency towards notions of the "free society". The late E. Armand, in an essay on "The Future Society", described this tendency in some detail and I reproduce his words here:

"I am aware that a good number of anarchist individualists have no interest in the 'future humanity'. For them: 'Without risk of erring too far, we can assume: 1. That there will never be a general, collective life from which authority is absolutely excluded; 2. That in all societies there will be individuals or groups who are protestants, malcontents, critics and negators. Without doubt we will witness transformations, improvements, modifications, even upheavals. The capitalist system of production may vanish in the end, gradually or forcibly. There may be an economic regime unlike ours. But whatever the social system, good sense indicates that its permanence depends on a system of regulation adapted to the average mentality of the people in it. Whether they want to or not, those to the right or left of this average regulation must conform their behaviour to it; and it matters little whether its basis is exclusively economic, or biological, or moral. Even collectivism can be competitively & tolerantly practised. Anarchists & libertarians ought to concede this right & liberty or voluntary slavery F

'Experience indicates that towards refractories they will use the only arguments men can dispose of: politics or violence, persuasion or compulsion, bargaining or command.

*F) to the collectivists & their
exteriorly autonomous communi-*

'The crowd always goes towards him who speaks well and carries himself well. Its angers last no longer than its admirations. It is always easy to fool and seduce. One can no more base oneself on it now than a century or a thousand years ago. The mass belongs to the strongest, the most superficial, the most slippery. In such a situation what do anarchist individualists do, what will they do?

*his
P107
J.Z.
12.
8.
97.*

'1. Some reply that they will remain within society and struggle to affirm themselves. They will not concern themselves too much with the choice of means, for their great concern - the concern of their lives - is, at all costs, to react against the external determination of their lives. What is it to affirm oneself if not to diminish the encroachment of society on oneself? They are reactors, refractories, propagandists, revolutionaries, utilizing all possible means of battle: education, violence, ruse, illegalism. They seize occasions when authority is particularly abusive to rouse the sentiment of rebellion among its victims. But it is for pleasure that they act, not for the profit of the sufferers or to delude them with vain words. They go, they come, mingling in a movement or withdrawing, as their initiative is or is not in danger of restriction, parting company with those they have called to revolt as soon as they pretend to follow them or constitute themselves a party. Perhaps they do, more than they are.

(Continued on page 7)

x1 I would be interested in correspondence between E. Armand &

Ulrich von Beckerath, 1882-1962. J.Z.

0357

STIRNER IN CONTEXT:

The Profanization of Hegelianism and the Genesis of Marx's Historical Materialism

by Chris R. Tame

It is perhaps a tribute to the impact - and timelessness - of Max Stirner's thought that it is almost invariably considered out of context, that is, not in relation to the intellectual background from which it emerged. Thus, the full significance of Stirner's membership (alongside the Bauers, Marx, and Engels) of the Berlin Young Hegelian Group Die Freien and of the relationship of his ideas to the overwhelmingly Hegelian intellectual atmosphere of Germany at that time, is not generally commented upon. (1) A relatively recent essay by N. Lobkowitz, "Karl Marx and Max Stirner", in the anthology Demythologizing Marxism (2) represents therefore an important, if unfortunately neglected, contribution to the understanding of Stirner's thought and, perhaps as importantly, its significance vi a vis the development of Marx's thought.

The two fundamental questions which lie at the basis of Lobkowitz's investigation are those which ask why Marx, after publishing his critique of the Left Hegelians, The Holy Family, in fact wrote yet another, even more voluminous manuscript on the same question - The German Ideology? And why was the large bulk of the latter work devoted specifically to a critique of Stirner?

The answer to these questions Lobkowitz sees in the challenge which Stirner's The Ego and His Own constituted to the whole edifice of Hegelian philosophy - of which Marx's thought was of course a part. Rather than just a figure - albeit important - in the history of individualist anarchism, it is more fruitful in some respects to see Stirner in relation to the dominant philosophy he faced, Hegelianism. To see him, in fact, as "the man who carried the profanization of Hegelian ideas further than any other Left Hegelian", as Lobkowitz puts it. (3)

The development of Hegelian philosophy by the Young - and Left - Hegelians had been, of course, one of "transformational criticism" (Feuerbach's term). Thus, whereas Hegel saw the 'truth' of the world in its resolution in the 'higher' world, that is, in the self-realization of God in the historical process, the evolving philosophy of the Left Hegelians represented "a more and more radical disenchantment and profanization of Hegelian ideas, a process in which Hegel's speculative and mystical categories were translated into the language of everyday experience and common sense." (4) In Strauss' Life of Jesus, Christ was thus reduced to the idea of the human species, and Feuerbach especially continued this process of the inversion of Hegelianism. For Feuerbach Hegelianism contained the clue to the real nature of religion, representing in fact religion's "esoteric psychology", God was actually man in his state of self-alienation, the result of human self-externalization. The slogan of the Young Hegelians was,

consequently, the "Realization of Philosophy", their goal to realize existentially man's divinity, to "make the world philosophical rather than to philosophize the world as Hegel had done. The next stage in the reduction of Hegelian abstraction came in the form of the communism of Moses Hess, Hegelianism representing for him "esoteric economics". Commercial, egoistic, money-seeking society was seen as the alienation of man from his natural productive activity. Marx, of course, concurred, his own search for the "unholy forms" of alienation extending rapidly from the political to the more fundamental economic form.

What then was the significance of Stirner's work in relation to Left Hegelianism? The point surely was, as Lobkowitz states, that all the Hegelians and Left Hegelians "treated existing man as a being still unredeemed, as someone who ought to become something other than what in fact he is: man ought to actualize rationality (Hegel), commits himself to mankind as if it were the saviour (Strauss), become an individual aware of and worshipping his species-essence (Feuerbach), abolish the atomism of civil society and establish socialism (Hess, Marx). But Stirner, who had reduced everything to a 'property' of the strictly individual ego, could and in fact very eloquently did, argue that all striving whatsoever for something higher is sheer nonsense." (5) *If your present reading speed is 150 words per minute & you strive towards speed reading of, say, 600 words per minute, that is sheer nonsense! J.E.*

The challenge of Stirner's analysis to the whole body of Left Hegelian thought, and particularly to Marx, was clearly a major and serious one. Marx had worked with other Left Hegelians in bringing the 'otherworldly' categories down to earth, down ultimately to the very basics of economic and social life, but, like them, he did not accept the world as it actually was. The Hegelian categories became, rather, the norms to which the world ought actually to conform. The Realization of Philosophy! To make the world philosophical was Marx's goal as it was for all the Left Hegelians. But, as Lobkowitz writes: "Then came Stirner, arguing that Communism was only replacing one illusion by another. In his fight against Hegelian abstractions, Stirner went even further than Marx. He declared a 'phantom' even the eschatology of the Hegelians, and the revolutionary enthusiasm issuing from it. Marx certainly wanted to abolish speculative philosophy, but only in order to transform it into a revolutionary activity. Stirner simply abolished philosophy in toto by declaring it all nonsense. In particular, while Marx had believed it was obvious that civil society was 'unphilosophical', and therefore had to be abolished and transcended, Stirner made the egoism of civil society his very principle. And he did this in the very name of a 'progress' in which Marx himself believed - in the name of the reduction of all transcendent and speculative categories to worldly realities....Stirner achieved the final concretization of Hegelianism by reducing all the Hegelian categories to the naked individual self....." (6)

"It does not exist when these "atoms" are not free to succeed to associate otherwise. J.E.

In the face of Stirner's challenge Marx, to salvage his ideals, either had to defend them in frankly normative terms, or find some other method of validation. In fact he chose the latter course. As Lobkowitz states: "When he read Stirner's denunciation of ideals, Marx probably became aware of the fact that his only possible defence consisted in describing the proletariat's selfless deed (i.e. revolution) as completely independent of philosophic ideas. If he could not show that the proletariat by necessity, and by itself, would achieve the ultimate human emancipation, he had to justify the ideals that the philosopher was supposed to bring to the proletariat. To put it in other terms: if he could not predict the proletarian revolution in terms of historical necessities entirely independent of philosophical speculations and ideals, Marx had to defend his own ideals against Stirner's attack. And this he was neither willing to do nor capable of doing". (7) And thus was born Marx's historical/dialectical materialism, the foundation for the whole of his supposedly 'Scientific Socialism'. The so-called 'new materialism' enunciated in The German Ideology can be seen as nothing but "the result of Marx's desperate effort to defend his communist ideals against Stirner's philosophy of total disillusionment". (8) Instead of giving up his revolutionary goals, his Left Hegelian desire to "realize philosophy", Marx thus advanced an interpretation of history by which it became possible to retain the content of those ideals without conceding their normative character (which Stirner had so effectively demolished). "Stirner had forced Marx to give up his approach (i.e. the Hegelian one), but he had not succeeded in forcing him to abandon his ideals. Marx simply translated his ideals into laws of history". (9)

Marx's line of defence against Stirner in The German Ideology was, ironically, to portray Stirner himself as representative of the last phase of "the putrescence of Absolute Spirit" and to consign him to the same historical dustbin as Bauer and Feuerbach. Nevertheless, the fact that his own historical materialism was essentially an attempt to rescue the 'critical' and revolutionary values of the Left Hegelians from the acidulous analysis of Stirner was surely apparent from the very ambiguity manifest at the core of Marx's philosophy. If communism was truly inevitable, then its urging by philosophers was meaningless. Yet in The German Ideology Marx still criticized the Left Hegelians (as he had done previously in this "Theses on Feuerbach") for restricting themselves to changing their ideas about the world rather than changing the world itself. The point is, of course, as Lobkowitz says, that "Marx does intend to change the world. He is simply inconsistent. On the one hand, he translates all his ideals into historical necessities; on the other hand he wants to remain a critic and a voice for revolutionary action. This ambiguity is the result of the intellectual genes that we tried to sketch. No one can meaningfully claim that it makes sense to criticise or applaud meaningless events, at least not in the sense of criticism that Marx had in mind, namely, a criticism that achieves something.

But if the necessary events are materialized ideals it is of course all too easy to forget their character of necessity".(10)

The longstanding debate (dating from the publication of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844) over the 'early' and the 'mature' Marx and the apparent dichotomy between the 'humanistic' and subjective theory of alienation of the former and the apparently abstract, impersonal 'social science' of the latter (11), receives considerable illumination from Lobkowitz's essay. Of course, Robert C. Tucker's Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (12) effectively disposed of the idea of the "two Marxes" and demonstrated in considerable detail how the categories of the early Marx were simply re-phrased and elaborated in the guise of an objective social science: "Original Marxism presented history as a story of man's self-alienation and ultimate transcendence of it in communism. Mature Marxism retells the tale, with added embellishments, in terms of the division of labour. It remains, however, essentially the same storythe communist ideal remains fundamentally psychological in content for the mature Marx. Instead of man being subordinate to the process of production, the process of production becomes subordinate to man and turns into pleasurable self-activity".(13) But the question which Tucker and other writers failed to answer satisfactorily was precisely why Marx should have transformed his own earlier system and why he should have obscured that transformation behind a smokescreen of criticism of Hegelian and neo-Hegelian idealism. The recent suggestion of Oscar J. Hansen in The Journal of the History of Ideas that "the transformation of the 'Young Marx' into an allegedly changed product represents little more than a shift in tactics", (14) rings rather hollow - especially when confronted with any serious consideration of the significance of The German Ideology. As Lobkowitz says, "Marx's critique of Stirner is so much out of proportion with the rest of his manuscript that it becomes understandable only if one assumes that Stirner had touched a sore point in Marx's own philosophy".(15) Given these considerations, Lobkowitz's essay throws light upon both the nature of Stirner's thought and upon the genesis of Marxism; "Marx developed (historical materialism) solely in order to be able to retain the ideals which he shared with the Left Hegelians and which Stirner had put into question".(16)

Notes:

- (1) George Woodcock's account of Stirner in Anarchism (London, Penguin, 1963) at least mentions the Hegelian background but hardly deals with its intellectual significance. Such anthologies as I.L.Horowitz, ed., The Anarchists (N.Y., Dell, 1964) and L.I. Krimmerman and L.Perry, ed., Patterns of Anarchy (N.Y. Doubleday-Anchor, 1966) do neither.
- (2) F.J.Adelman, ed., Demythologizing Marxism: A Series of Studies on Marxism (Boston College, Chestnut Hill, 1969; Boston College Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 2)

- (3) Ibid., p.79.
- (4) Ibid., p.83.
- (5) Ibid., p.75-76.
- (6) Ibid., p.85.
- (7) Ibid., p.88-89.
- (8) Ibid., p.89.
- (9) Ibid., p.89-90.
- (10) Ibid., p.94
- (11) Cf. Daniel Bell's argument that the Marx of the Manuscripts "is not the historical Marx"; "The Debate on Alienation", in L. Lebedz, ed., Revisionism: Essays in the History of Marxist Ideas (London, Allen & Unwin, 1962) p.197. And also Herbert Marcuse's statement that "Marx's early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be overemphasized", Reason and Revolution (N.Y., Humanities Press, 1954) p.295
- (12) Cambridge University Press, 1961. Also see his briefer account in The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (London, Allen and Unwin, 1970, pp. 3-32.
- (13) Philosophy and Myth....op cit., pp. 188 and 189. Tucker's point about the unscientific origins of the supposedly scientific socialism should be stressed: "Marxism...did not arise out of an empirical study of economic processes in modern society. Marx had next to no direct knowledge of workers and working conditions, and had only just begun the study of political economy, at the moment of creation of his economic interpretation of history". Ibid. p.218. Rather, as Tucker clearly demonstrates, the "original inspiration" of Marxism was essentially a religious one, a desire for the "redemption" of man from the "realm of necessity". It was "the enslaving subordination of man to the division of labour" with which Marx was primarily concerned. Man's "dehumanization" and "alienation" from his natural productive powers was - in Marx's view - the result of occupational specialization and all that ensued from it. Man's lack of "freedom" was precisely his inability "to develop and exercise all his faculties, physical and mental, in all directions" (Anti-Dühring) and hence human self-realization was incompatible with the division of labour. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea, passim.
- (14) O.J.Hammen, "The Young Marx Reconsidered", Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, Jan-March 1970, p 110. As Hammen puts it at greater length: "the excessive stress in the 'Manuscripts of 1844'on humanity, alienation, and similar notions represented his conception of what was most appropriate at the moment for exciting a revolutionary spirit and for calling forth an energetic communist consciousness. After a year Marx (and Engels also) abandoned that line when it appeared that such an approach failed to produce the expected results". Ibid., p 119. However, Hammen makes a more persuasive case for the existence of "tactical shuffling" and "tactical adjustments" by Marx and for their

impact on his philosophy, in his more recent essay, "Alienation, Communism and Revolution in the Marx-Engels Briefwechsel" Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 33, No.1, Jan-March 1972.

(15) Lobkowitz, op cit, p.79.

(16) Ibid. p. 93.

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LETTER

I saw a copy of your review of my book (i.e. The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner) in Anarchy, and can quite see why you would want to take issue with some of the things I say in it, approaching Stirner as you do from an anarchist standpoint. However, perhaps I ought to say that when I wrote the book I found Stirner's philosophy a highly attractive one, and I still consider him to be a profoundly important thinker. The point I want to make is that the book was not the outcome of any antipathy to Stirner (as I interpreted him), rather the reverse. I still think of my interpretation of his meaning is essentially correct!

R.W.K. Paterson,
University of Hull

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Continued from page one...

'2. Others situate themselves on the margin of society. Having somehow obtained means of production, they preoccupy themselves with making their separation from society a reality, trying to produce enough for themselves, while eliminating the factitious and the surplus.

'Because men, in general, seem to them hardly worth bothering about, they maintain only the minimum relations with people and human institutions, and their social life is limited to the company of selected 'comrades of ideas'. They group together at times, but only temporarily, and the limited associations of which they are part is never delegated power to dispose of their product. The rest of the world exists for them only little or much - to the extent that they need it. Perhaps they are, more than they do.

'Between these two conceptions of individualist life, the diverse anarchist individualist temperaments range themselves.'

"For the comrades whose opinions I have just transcribed, any sketch of "future humanity", any hypothesis of an individualist society, is a work of imagination, pure literary fantasy. They maintain that, for the mentality, the general will, really to transform itself, it would be necessary that "the species on the road to degeneration, the 'directed categories', deliver the earth of their presence: and that is not likely."

IN DEFENCE OF FAILURE, IN PRAISE OF DYLAN THOMAS.

Pat Parker

If Dylan Thomas was a failure, then long live failure! Genius and failure often go together. Genius is a kind and unkind word, a sneer, an excuse, an explanation for the inexplicable, or the highest form of praise and admiration - a deviation from the norm, an individual with such an excess of intellectual, emotional and physical energy that others beside him can appear pale and half alive.

Dylan Thomas was a success in spite of his self-destructive urge. He gave out as generously as he took in. If you eat big you must shit big, or become a constipated bore with all the right answers and hardly a feeling to call your own.

So he drank too much and died. If you are flat-spirited and possessed of the hope that death is the end, oblivion, nothingness, then I suppose the urge to self-destruction could be called the urge to failure. Creative genius is the longing towards creative ecstasy, and the desire for death is part and parcel of the same desire. They appear opposites, but they lead to the same end - re-union with the source of oneself.

Genius does not appear to be of this world at all, yet paradoxically is more of this world than any other being in it. He has a drive and a force that is unknown to the average man. That his appetites are usually excessive and exaggerated is not surprising, but that they play havoc with his physical and mental health and bring in their wake premature death is not as true as it is popular to believe.

Thomas himself did explain: "I have an angel, a beast, and a madman in me." And any other human being so arranged would certainly behave irresponsibly as the world terms it.

Success is to be measured as quality, not quantity. Correct and proper people who eat sensibly and sparingly and are teetotallers live to be 90, but does it really matter? Is that success, 90 years of mediocrity, moderation and manners?

Dylan Thomas was a "giver", a "maker" to borrow the phrase Welsh novelist Ron Berry used about Henry Miller and D.H. Lawrence. These phrases look a bit embarrassing on paper, as do all easy generalisations which are too often and too carelessly applied. A real giver or maker is dynamic in practice. His vitality and anarchic sense of fun can call out the hidden, or often forgotten, vitality in others. This ability has got nothing to do with holding the right progressive views. It links people through the barriers of class and ideology.

We are each of us unique, yet it is an unimaginative individual

whose uniqueness cannot recognize what he has in common with everyone else who lives, loves and dies on this blue earth.

Genius has its source in the world of "endless blossoming and burning". Thomas died prematurely, but how did he live? The answer is, well, uproariously at times. Life was a feast to be enjoyed to the full. Dedicated and disciplined poet that he was, living - that is, whatever is to be got out of the moment - came first. He was weak and strong, generous and essentially (as all artists must be) greedy, impulsive, self-destructive, a clown, a Hamlet overloaded with self-pity, over-anxious, phobic, a niggler for detail, a royal pain in the arse.

Did he sacrifice himself too much to please others? Probably, yes. But then an angel, a beast, and a madman were battling in one man's soul. It is an understandable sacrifice - and death is not the end of everything, just another aspect of life. Birth connects to death as love to hate, night to morning. He created a feast out of living, loving and suffering. Such exaggerations appal our everyday emotions. As he said, his poems "with all their crudities, doubts and confusions, are written for the love of Man and in praise of God, and I'd be a damn' fool if they weren't!"

(Dylan Thomas, Welsh poet and dramatist, died on November the 9th., 1953, at the age of 39)

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Important Notice

Change of address

From now on all communications, contributions, subscriptions and exchanges should be sent to:

S.E.Parker at

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Also, due to increases in the bank charges for the collection of cheques from the USA, the subscription for six issues is now 2 dollars, 50 cents.

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RECOMMENDATION

Like films? Then see Peter O'Toole in "The Ruling Class" and Malcolm McDowell in Lindsay Anderson's "O Lucky Man".

P.P. & S.E.P.

BOOK REVIEWS

S. E. Parker

(Germany's Post-Anarchist: John Henry Mackay. By Thomas A. Riley. The Revisionist Press, GPO Box 2009, Brooklyn, N.Y. 11202. \$16.50)

So little is available in English on the history of anarchist individualism that I would have liked to have hailed unreservedly this study of John Henry Mackay, the biographer of Stirner, particularly since its author had previously published two very interesting, and sympathetic essays on the same subject during the 1940s. Mr. Riley has done a considerable amount of pioneering biographical spadework on Mackay, has paid a generous tribute to his literary achievements, has brought to light his hitherto unknown part in the struggle for the "rights" of homosexuals (of whom he was one), and generally made a commendable attempt to put this neglected and often misunderstood writer on the map. Unfortunately, Mr. Riley's book suffers from serious shortcomings - some of which I shall note here - which make a critical approach imperative.

The worst and most exasperating are the numerous quotations from Mackay and his commentators. Either from laziness or a perverted form of linguistic snobbery the author (and/or publisher) has left virtually all quotations from German sources in their original German. And since these comprise about one third of the book the reader who, like myself, knows no German, has been sold something of a pig in a poke. How can such a reader assess the validity of a judgement when confronted as evidence with a quotation that, so far as he/she is concerned, might just as well be written in Chocktaw? This is, after all, a book by an American, published in America by an American company, and up to the time of writing I understand that the vast majority of Americans speak, read and write a language somewhat different from German and rather similar to the one I am using now. To restrict the appeal of the book by such a shortsighted blunder strikes me as a silly act on the part of people professedly concerned to make Mackay better known.

There are also statements made by Mr. Riley concerning anarchist individualism that are unreliable, to say the least.

On page 58 he claims that "individualistic anarchism" was "Basically an American product". This is not so. There exists a "European tradition" of anarchist individualism, some of whose advocates (e.g. Mackay, Armand) were influenced to varying degrees by Warren, Spooner and Tucker, but which originated independently of them. Indeed, it can be counter-claimed that the "American tradition," particularly as exemplified by Tucker, was often more mutualistic, than individualistic.

When it comes to Britain Mr. Riley is well off the mark. He asserts that "Since World War II, Individualistic Anarchism has been fostered by the work of such Tucker-admirers as.....Henry Meulen.....with his journal The Individualist". This is sheer nonsense. Meulen certainly quotes Tucker approvingly from time to time and was certainly known as an "individualistic anarchist" in his youth, but his present views have nothing to do with anarchist individualism. Meulen supports the State-imposed apartheid system in South Africa and during the last British General Election called for a conservative government headed by that arch-patriot Enoch Powell! Apart from his theory of banking reform, which has some affinities with Tucker's mutualism, he is little more than a voice of that type of right-wing Toryism that pays lip-service to "individual liberty" when the individual is white, but foregoes even that when the individual is black. Anarchist individualism in Britain since World War II has not been fostered by Henry Meulen, but by such journals as Minus One and Individualist Forum, by one or two short-lived groups inspired by these, and by the contributions of such individualists as myself, Jeff Robinson, Francis Ellingham and others (like the long lost Alan Smith) to Freedom and Anarchy. *(Stokarian self-praise & prejudice. J. Z.)*

Mr. Riley maintains that Stirner's The Ego and His Own "soon became known as the anarchist bible". To whom? Victor Basch once referred to it as the "bible" of the anarchist individualists (L'individualisme anarchiste: Max Stirner, 1904), although I doubt if many individualists would regard it in such a way. However, to call it the "bible" of all those who call themselves anarchists (including anti-parliamentary communists and revolutionary syndicalists) is meaningless for most of these have never read it and would not agree with it if they had. He also appears to be wrong in his statement that it was Tucker who introduced James L. Walker to Stirner's book. According to Walker, he first learnt of it in 1872 and I doubt very much if Tucker had even heard of Stirner at that time in view of his adherence to the legend of "natural rights" until the middle 1880's.

Again, Mr. Riley writes that in The Anarchists Mackay "put the anarchists en masse, and all through the book had dealt with crowds: street crowds, unemployed demonstrations, political assemblies." Since Mackay clearly regards the book's "hero", Carraud Auben, and his friend Dr. Hurt, as the only authentic anarchists involved, it is difficult to understand how he is dealing with "anarchists en masse". Indeed, even assuming, contrary to Mackay's views, that "anarchists" included "anarchist communists",^x one can hardly say that they figure "en masse" in the book, particularly since Mackay scrupulously delineates the non-anarchist character of the crowds he describes.

Mr. Riley also makes the customary genuflection towards a "psychiatric" interpretation of anarchism and writes of "Mackay's hatred of his foster father and the man's real children, a situation

x) "Communists with SOME anarchist or anti-authoritarian notions but who remain rather dominating or intolerant towards dissenters & towards the property of non-communists" - might be a better, but all too long description. J.Z. 11.2.77.

a psychiatrist would immediately connect with the poet's anarchism." He also quotes the following piece of verbosity from a "psychiatric study" of anarchism published in 1939, although its connection with the dubious Freudian speculation preceding it seems rather remote: ".....antistatism generally emerges from a tensional zone in society, the zone at which an exogenous group comes into conflict with an indigenous group, or an ascendant group encounters the opposition of the higher classes. When the exogenous group or ascendant class is blocked in its attempt to climb the social ladder, it tends to reject the existing state. Antistatism generally emanates from the area where the blocking occurs." *Is anarchism strong in South Africa, the Balkans, Lebanon, etc? J.Z.*

What this has to do with the anarchist rejection of all states, not merely the existing state, is not easy to discern. I suppose that editors of psychiatric journals have their silly seasons, like those of the more vulgar publications, and have to find something to fill their columns during them, but why did Mr. Riley find it necessary to quote such a pitiful passage?

Despite its shortcomings and exorbitant price, Thomas A. Riley's study of Mackay is worth reading, and for those who cannot afford it a library or a piece of "illegalism" is a possibility. Perhaps if it ever appears in a second edition we could have it all in English...

(The Anarchists. By John Henry Mackay. Translated from the German by George Schumm. Publisher as above. \$15.50)

It is good to see The Anarchists in print again. This English version was first published by Benjamin Tucker in 1891 and has had to wait over eighty years for a second edition. Now this gross neglect has been remedied, although the price is far too high and the new publishers have not bothered to give any details of the original edition.

Years ago, when I was still haunted by the spook of libertarian communism, The Anarchists was a staple item of my regular reading. In those days, I accepted neither its author's anti-communism, nor his advocacy of conscious egoism, but I found his book a compelling and powerful piece of work. Mackay's masterful depiction of the "social scene" in the London of 1887, his description of its malcontents and rebels, his record of the arguments between individualists and communists, drew me again and again to his pages. When I eventually followed the same path as his and abandoned the marshland of utopian communism for the solid ground of anarcho-egoism, The Anarchists became even more important to me. The events and personalities it delineates have gone long ago, but the problems posed still remain and the arguments about them flourish as strongly as ever.

I have followed the same path as Mackay, but I have gone further than him. In The Anarchists he still clings to the notion that one

day the interests of the individual and those of "society" will become the same. Unlike the libertarian communists he bases such a prediction upon a general acceptance of conscious egoism, but he nonetheless shares their utopianism by his belief in the "solidarist myth". It was for this that Enzo Martucci accused him of "sweetening Stirner" and the accusation is a just one. I do not believe that egoism will ever be generally accepted, nor that that it will ever be possible, or desirable, that individual interests and those of "society" will be harmonized. *Piot!*

Despite this flaw in Mackey's otherwise firm realism, The Anarchists is a book to have and to read.

(Anthology 73. Poems by Yoko Danno, William Flygare, Lindley Williams Hubbell, Hisao Kanaseki, and Hiroaki Sato. The Ikuta Press. Mito, Showa 48, Japan 1973. No price given)

This anthology of American and Japanese poets is of uneven quality. The best contributions are by William Flygare, well-known to readers, and I particularly liked his Three Necessaries, Pagliaccio Paints Picasso Blue, and the pithy "I did that too as a child you chide/ my catching snowflakes on the glide./ When did you say it was you died?"

Lindley Williams Hubbell also makes his mark. I liked his Taste and the starkly truthful Terza Ring which concludes "Be vigilant and wise/ Before you are undone./ Men should live as he dies,/ Defiant and alone."

(The Mask of Anarchy. By Percy Bysshe Shelley. Covers by Arthur Moyse. A Kropotkin Lighthouse Publication published by Jim Huggon. 20p)

This reprint of Shelley's verse message to the English workers to non-violently resist the oppressions of their masters is a reminder of the persistence of the proletarian myth. For over 150 years idealists such as Shelley have been exhorting the "workers" to be this or that, to do this or that, and their response has been virtually nil - unless the call has been to war. Shelley's intention was no doubt of the best, but his poetry here is not. A collector's item whose main value is to provoke reflection on what Oscar Levy well-called "the idiocy of idealism".

(L'Etre et le Cosmos. By Daniel Giraud. Published by the author, Poste Restante, 09 Saint Giron, France. 10F)

Mystico-astrological interpretation of "trans-individualisms" which I hope to get some French reading reader to review later. Perhaps he/she will elucidate what has happened to this once militant individualist poet of the streets of Paris...

NOSTALGIA AND NEWERALGIA: Ruminations In Lieu of Review

by W.F.

(Martin, James J.: Revisionist Viewpoints: Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition. Ralph Kyles Publisher, Inc., Box 1533, Colorado Springs, Colorado 80901, USA. 1971)

Forbidding myself side-reading till my projects were better under way, I disobeyed myself....in this case...to ruminate on -algies:

I. On the "Defence" Origins of the New Imperialism: Death begins in the Forties.

II. A Look at Conscription, Then and Now:

I had laymanly sensed increasing social suffocation since the dirty-thirties and had experienced a number of sharp little shocks as on Dec. 8, 1972 when, on passport renewal, I learned that nothing can be done back in the U.S. without one's SS-card (can't find mine, begins with O18-, but need it not here where I be a pedestrian), BUT..

(p. 28 footnote) on learning that among the men in a 97 college(s) poll, 61% favoured conscription, I was filled with a strange sense of horror; the (self-) 'disdain' that La Boetie refers to came too close to home. Wonder what the Women's Lip (to-Lip) rating would have been. (I should have expected 0.61% for the men).
0.61%.

Being tagged as a "4F-er" (even if you wa-ren't one) was unpleasant; even now, you sometimes get, "Were you in the army?"

III. The Unresolved Question of Fascism:

The nearest I got to a definition of fascism was that of a desperate attempt at order in the aftermath of a disastrous peace; I was right in judging it a reaction, but the kind was unclear.

The peace propoganda of my formative years made the succeeding jingo a jump too hard to make, and the enemies were painted too black for belief.

"Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition" did not strike me as a lovely tune for "saints" to come marchin' in to...."and stuff like there."

I must thank Thoreau and Nietzsche sometime for their tips on newspapers; how could Dr. Martin wade through so many tons of crap to get his marvellous documentation?

IV. The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Question - In 1944:

I refuse to believe that there have been any wars since 1918, the First World War having been fought to end all wars; there have been murders, rapes, tortures, pillages, robberies, mass exterminations, and what have you, but please do not call them wars.

The Bombing: "His jaw hurt my fist."

What made the artists and egg-heads goof,
especially poets who should remain aloof?

(p.96): Walter Pitkin's "A Short Introduction to the History of Human Stupidity" (quoted) could have been expanded into a goodly sized encyclopedia.

(p.98): On Casino: ..and not so much a tactical stupidity as an unpardonable cultural shame...

(p.113): Ah yes, "Crime Marches On!" ("March of Time", a newsreel).

Add: ...and cannibals eat missionaries because missionaries eat cannibals.. (Gored is good).

(p.121): For each ton of bombs on England, 315 tons on Germany.

In '43, refusal to "appease" meant refusal to a peace; in '45, Mr. Hartman and Miss Brittain must have said, "I told you so!"

V. The Return of the "War Crimes"—"War Criminals Issue"

Leo Tzu ~~≠~~ 31: "Conduct your triumph like a funeral"....but then who gives a damned damn about wisdom.

Might "might be right" be right?

(p.128): One out of two conscripts can't or won't aim or shoot at an enemy.

(p.129-footnote): Would be interesting to see how much the revisionists have been able to do with the atrocities done by the winners and to what extent those by the losers have been muddled.

Further afield, it would also be interesting to learn about Freud'd role as the father of the new inquisition.

(p.130): New meaning of "justice": Winners judge losers.
(What if there had been Swiss and Swedish judges on the bench?)

(p.131): Happy to see the expression of two views I have long held: Killing is qualitative, not quantitative (knife vs. atom bomb). According to theologians, killing strangers far away merits medals, while killing for personal grievance hastens hanging; for enemies, the law is reversed.

VI. American Mass-Media and Stalinism:

"Stalin wasn't stallin'" (a "hit" in those days).

(p.68): Current function of book reviews exposed; what you learn on this page warrants the price of the book.

VII. Revisionism and the Cold War, 1946-1966:

Stalin's now appalin' (a quick switch for short memories)

APP. 1: J.M.Keynes's Famous Foreword to the 1936 German Edition of the General Theory:

Fascists keen on Keynes; Keynes keen on them.

APP. 11: Meditations upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles:

....before he dulled; men do get tired after a while.

APP. 111; History and Social Intelligence:

The purpose of the collection: a tribute to the memory and the work of Harry Elmer Barnes; success after WW I and frustration after WW II.

My being one of those for whom temperaments, attitudes, moods, and notions arc, despite novelty in intensity and instruments, as old as the species, I, in my Miranda-like innocence, was under the impression that all of Clio's devotees shared the revisionist code of honest documentation and interpretation regardless of economico-politico-maniac and ethno-pathological considerations, but it appears that Clio is now being sold into prostitution as often as are the other eight Muses.

In a fine, scholarly manner, these essays tell us that the manners of Al Capone and Dillinger have now been replaced by those of "The Syndicate". The successors to Hitlin and Statler, and their competitors, are now operating more operatively, if less operatically, in their respective territories in the bootlegging of mental straight-jackets and assorted shackles behind curtains of iron, bamboo, and plastics. We learn that marvellous progress is being made to make life without living approach perfection and to make death less awesome than it might once have been.

(N.B. 'nostos' means 'go home'; home is everywhere; so is new. 'algia' means pain.)

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