What is a UnionOfEgoists.com?
This is an informational resource provided by Kevin I. Slaughter of Underworld Amusements and Trevor Blake of OVO, initiated in February and publicly launched April 1st of 2016. The website initially focuses on providing historical, biographical and bibliographical details of a few their favorite Egoist philosophers. It is also integrating the archives of egoist website i-studies.com, the former project of Svein Olav Nyberg, and the EgoistArchives.com project of Dan Davies. Further, it will be home to Der Geist, a Journal of Egoism in print 1845 – 1945. UnionOfEgoists.com will be the best resource for Egoism online.

What is a Union of Egoists?
“We two, the State and I, are enemies. I, the egoist, have not at heart the welfare of this “human society,” I sacrifice nothing to it, I only utilize it; but to be able to utilize it completely I transform it rather into my property and my creature; i. e., I annihilate it, and form in its place the Union of Egoists.”

– Max Stirner, The Ego and Its Own

What is Egoism?
“Egoism is the claim that the Individual is the measure of all things. In ethics, in epistemology, in aesthetics, in society, the Individual is the best and only arbitrator. Egoism claims social convention, laws, other people, religion, language, time and all other forces outside of the Individual are an impediment to the liberty and existence of the Individual. Such impediments may be tolerated but they have no special standing to the Individual, who may elect to ignore or subvert or destroy them as He can. In egoism the State has no monopoly to take tax or to wage war.”

– Trevor Blake, Confessions of a Failed Egoist
ANARCHISM, INDIVIDUALISM AND MAX STIRNER.

After a break of a few years the attack on the conscious egoism of Max Stirner has been resumed. Now a Mr. Roger P. Clark has written a book entitled "Max Stirner's Egoism" in which he argues as one who was "once quite sympathetic to individualism" but now has his head firmly stuck into the tarbucket of "social anarchism. The result is a dismissal of "metaphysical egoism" as a "groundless superstition".

I do not propose to deal here with the more abstruse philosophical objections that form a large part of Mr. Clark's indictment. To do this properly would need a reply almost as long as his book. For the time being, therefore, I will confine myself to certain of his views on the relationship of Max Stirner to anarchism and individualism.

Nonetheless, before doing so, it is worthwhile noting that Mr. Clark does not hesitate to resurrect a few hoary old philosophical chestnuts in making out his case. One of these is the "groundless" notion that Stirner, despite his explicit disavowals, conceived of his ego as an "Absolute" (Mr. Clark seeks to add impressiveness to his charge by describing it as "the mystic absolute"). And he rejects his fellow-critic R.W.K. Paterson's denial of this by claiming that "this is what Stirner does when he raises the ego to an independent reality contrary to its objective place in the course of nature". After such a piece of bafflegab, I am not in the least surprised that he can ascribe some "rational significance" to "traditional mysticism"....

Like Mr. Paterson, in his much profounder work "The Egoistic Nihilist: Max Stirner", Roger P. Clark claims that the conscious egoist must want everyone else to be supine and servile so that he can best take advantage of them. In doing so he ignores, amongst other things, Stirner's contention that "He who, to hold his own, must count on the absence of will in others is a thing made by these others, as the master is a thing made by the servant. If submissiveness ceased, it would be all over with lordship." Why tend to be submissive to a monopoly payment system - from which even the masters suffer by financial difficulties, strikes, bankruptcies?

But why should the egoist not enjoy testing his strength against a worthy opponent or relish the company of shrewd and strong friends? It is really amazing how quick moralists are to fasten upon egoists a new categorical imperative: that they should live up to the Judeo-Christian conception of what an egoist ought to be! Stirner himself disposed of this particular petulance as follows:

"The egoist, before whom the humanists shudder, is a spook as much as the devil is; he exists only as a bogey and phantom in their brain. If they were not unsophisticatedly drifting back and forth in the antediluvian opposition between good and evil, to which they have given the modern names of 'human' and 'egoistic', they would not have freshened up the hoary 'sinner' into an 'egoist' either, and put a new patch on an old garment."

Mr. Clark acknowledges Stirner to be an anarchist, but thinks that his anarchism is of the most "inconsistent and contradictory type". This is because it appears that, while Stirner rejects domination over the
individual by the State, he "still accepts the authoritarian consciousness". Mr. Clark identifies "authority" with any form of domination and so, when Stirner said that "might is right", he is immediately condemned as an authoritarian.

But authority is not the same as power, nor do all forms of domination rest on authority. Authoritative power dominates primarily by means of the allegiance it commands from those who believe in and support it. Authority is therefore legitimized power. A power, as Enzo Martucci once put it, "which all must adore and serve even if they possess the energy and capacity to overthrow it". While it certainly matters if some individuals try to become authorities vis-a-vis other individuals, the natural impulse to be dominant vis-a-vis others does not seem to me to matter so much. Indeed, as James L. Walker observed in his The Philosophy of Egoism, "if vigilance be the price of liberty, who will deny that the tendency, within Egoistic limits, to some invasion is the sure creator and sustenance of vigilance? The vaporizing, non-Egoistic philosophers would place tolerance upon a cloud-bank foundation of sentiment and attempt to recompense with fine words of praise the men who can be persuaded to forego any advantage which they might take of others. Like the preachers who picture the pleasure of sin and urge people to refrain from it, their attempts are inevitably futile."

For me Max Stirner's egoism has nothing to do with whether his views do or do not fit in with someone else's conception of an "anarchist" utopia. It is true that, since he was still to some extent the child of his time, his ideas are not entirely free from utopian speculations. In this respect, although for quite different reasons, I agree with Mr. Clark that Stirner was "over-optimistic" about his "associations of egoists" becoming universalized. But such speculations are only froth on the fundamentals of his philosophy and for realistic anarchist-individualists living, in the here and now they can safely be regarded as of mere historical interest. What is important about his magnificent defence of the individual against authority is its value as an intellectual armory that can be appropriated by those like myself who view the conflict between the individual and the collective as endless.

Mr. Clark tries to counter Stirnerian egoism by invoking certain vagaries of Arthur Koestler about "holons" or "self-regulating systems which display both the autonomous properties of wholes and the dependent properties of parts" - a sort of philosophical version of the stage-magician's "now you see it and now you don't". He also refers to Lewis Mumford's collectivist mystifications, Murray Bookchin's trendy ecologism and A.N. Whitehead's woolly-headed "philosophy of organism". After all this it is not surprising that he concludes by claiming that Hegel and his "Whole-i-ness" "appear to be justified". Of course, none of these profundities are spelt out in concrete detail, but, then, one does not expect that purveyors of social dreamlands and defenders of the 'ghost of God' would stoop to such mundané things. To be unfashionable enough to see merit in Stirner's radical nominalism is obviously sufficient ground in the eye of Mr. Clark for one to be shoed aside as "superstitious" - but we shall see who laughs last....

Anarchism is an individualism, not a socialism!


10 Not if they are panarchistic egoists - who might even realize some altruistic system, which they like, among themselves. J.2.1 895.
11 Or at least tolerate others acting altruistically among themselves. J.2.20. 897.
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STIRNER AND THE MYTH OF PLURALISM

Francis Ellingham

PLURALISM (in this article): The doctrine that there are many separate things, as opposed to monism, the doctrine that there is only one thing.

Once upon an apparently particular time, there was a distinguished philosopher in Britain named Andrew Seth, who wrote a book entitled "Hegelianism and Personality" (1887). This book, writes John Passmore ("A Hundred Years of Philosophy", Penguin, 1968) is "a protest against the whole tendency of Hegelian philosophy in the name of the unequivocal testimony of consciousness." In some respects it resembles Stirner's "The Ego and His Own", published forty years earlier.

Seth argues, writes Passmore, that "in Hegelianism, all distinctness, all particularity vanishes. The facts of nature are converted into mere exemplifications of general logical principles; human personality disappears into the Family, the Community, the Absolute. In contrast, Seth exalts the claims of the particular: 'The meanest thing that exists,' he writes, 'has a life of its own, absolutely unique and individual.' In order to consider it as an object of scientific knowledge, we must no doubt describe it in general terms. But this is only to say, Seth concludes, that knowledge never grasps the thing itself..."

"This general defence of particularity," Passmore goes on, "Seth applies to the self....'Each self,' he writes, 'is a unique existence, which is perfectly impervious, if I may so speak, to other selves... The very characteristic of a self is this exclusiveness...I have a centre of my own, a will of my own, which no one shares with me or can share..." Selves exist, he admits, in relationship one to another—the recognize themselves as interacting with other persons and with nature—but in all such relations, according to Seth, they retain their uniqueness, their imperviousness."

But, alas, a difficulty arose. Seth found it impossible to explain how absolutely exclusive and impervious entities could interact. "In his later writings," Passmore tells us, "he regrets that he had ever described selves as 'impervious'; now he emphasizes the intimacy of their relations one to another and to God." "God and Man," Seth now writes, "become bare points of existence—impossible abstractions—if we try to separate them from one another and from the structural elements of their common life." This was the very difficulty that had led Hegel to interpret God, selves, and nature as manifestations of a single Spirit. Even if God is left out, the difficulty remains.

I have begun with this story because it illustrates how certain minds, assuming that plurality is an undeniable fact, are liable to come to grief. Common sense may insist that there are many separate things, but it also insists that they interact—without explaining how. Nor does common sense explain what the absolutely separate self, exclusively and imperviously persisting through time, with a will of its own, consists of. Nor, incidentally, does it explain the well attested psychical phenomena of precognition, clairvoyance, and telepathy—which all suggest monism.

The truth is that "the unequivocal testimony of consciousness" is far less unequivocal than common sense is prepared to admit, and common sense dissolves into uncertainty the moment it is subjected to philosophical criticism. Philosophers have been discussing the issue of monism versus pluralism for thousands of years without solving the
many problems involved. If monists run into serious intellectual difficulties, so do pluralists, and if monism, in the light of cold reason, seems like a myth, so does pluralism. People therefore who dogmatically assert that pluralism is so obviously true that only a fool would question it are just prejudiced.

Dogmatic pluralists are sometimes found appealing to science to confirm their atomic or "granular" view of the universe: subatomic physics, they claim, has shown that each electron is a discrete bundle of energy, separate from every other electron. However, the philosophical implications of subatomic physics are by no means agreed. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1974) can only ask: "Is an electron, say, a discrete particle that just happens to elude man's exact observation; is it an essentially blurred wave bundle having no precise dynamical characteristics; is it a concentration of probability, a mere theoretical symbol, or what?" (Article on Philosophy of Science)

On such questions there is, as yet, no general agreement. But Schrödinger and Bohm, scientists of great eminence in this field, have taken a monistic view of the universe. Moreover, there is now great excitement among physicists over the alleged discovery of many more subatomic particles than had previously been postulated, and it is even thought that there may be infinite series of particles. In that case, the idea of an ultimate discrete particle, and with it the idea of a "granular" universe, will presumably go for good.

The present situation, then, is that neither philosophy nor science has yet completely vindicated either monism or pluralism. There is, moreover, another type of evidence - that of mysticism. The fact that many mystics, at widely different times and in widely various cultures, have independently proclaimed the fundamental unity of existence, is not to be lightly dismissed.

Some people say mysticism is an illusion: the mystic, they argue, only experiences an unusual state of his own brain. These people are not mystics themselves, not have they paid much attention to mystical literature. Actually, the so-called mystical "experience" is a kind of awareness which is utterly different from what is normally called experience. And it is so shattering that the mystic instantly realizes that no brain could possibly have invented it. If it were an illusion, a trick of the brain, it would have to be based on previous experience - on memories of past incidents, recorded in the brain cells. But, with one voice, the mystics declare that this thing is always wholly new, wholly outside the reach of experience and memory.

"But still," it may be said, "the mystic is only aware of his own self." In a sense this must be true, given a monistic universe. But if the word "self" only means a bundle of experiences and memories, it must be false. In this matter, as in others, pluralists try to carry conviction by employing a vague notion of the self which they never attempt to clarify.

For me, the evidence of mysticism is decisive. In a sense which cannot be grasped by non-mystics, all apparently separate things are fundamentally one, and pluralism is a myth.

Now, how does all this relate to Stirner?

Some people interpret Stirner's concept of the unique ego as if it were the equivalent of Seth's "Impervious" self, and they think that Stirner, like the early Seth, believed in the existence of many. absolutely separate selves. But they cannot explain how, if that is
what Stirner believed, he would have dealt with the obvious questions: how do such selves interact, and what is it, in each self, that remains absolutely separate and "impervious" during interaction?

Nor can these people explain why, if Stirner believed in many selves, he called himself "the sole ego" and "the unique one". Some say that by the word "unique" he simply meant that no self is identical with another. If so, "x is unique" for Stirner, simply meant "x is x" (the logical principle of identity), which reduces Stirner to triviality. Can we really believe that by "I am the unique one" Stirner only meant "I am I"?

I would suggest that Stirner, at least unconsciously, was a monist, and that his "unique one", even if he did not know it, was the "creative source" of which the mystics speak - an "emptiness" or "void" which in some sense is the origin of matter, thought, and intelligence, and which fundamentally is the only thing that exists. On this view Stirner did not claim to be the only finite self, (yet) nor did he reduce his finite self to a mere drop in the ocean of the Absolute. Rather, he unconsciously felt, even if he never quite said, "My apparently finite self is the Absolute."

Some people stoutly maintain that such a view of Stirner cannot possibly be extracted from his actual writings. Yet "The Ego and His Own" contains several statements which sound extraordinarily mystical. At the beginning of the book Stirner writes: "I am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which I myself as creator create everything." And at the end he writes: "In the unique one the owner himself returns into his creative nothing, of which he is born." How do non-mystical pluralist Stimeritox explain this "creative nothing"? And what is the relation of "the owner" to "the unique one", if not that of the apparently finite self to the Absolute?

(One last word. It is sometimes argued that the political outcome of monism must be totalitarianism: the fact that Hegel's philosophy was exploited by the Nazis lends some colour to this suggestion. However, as Aldous Huxley pointed out, "the cult of unity on the political level is only an idolatrous drestz for the genuine religion of unity on the personal and spiritual levels" - "The Perennial Philosophy", Chapter One. Only people lacking a mystical sense of "oneness" are tempted to drown their sorrows in the poisonous brew of totalitarianism.)

11.8.76

IS MR. ELLINHAM "MYHTTAKEN" ABOUT MONISM? A Reply to Mr. Francis Ellinham's Article, "Max Stirner and the Myth of Pluralism."

Scepticus

"For let us imagine that there exists only a single being, then such a being needs no knowledge, because there would not then exist anything different from that one being itself - anything whose existence such a being would therefore have to take up into itself, only indirectly through knowledge, in other words, through picture and concept. It would already itself be all in all; consequently there would remain nothing for it to know, in other words, nothing foreign that could be apprehended as object. On the other hand, with the plurality of beings, every individual finds itself in a state of isolation from all the rest, and from this arises the necessity for knowledge."

Arthur Schopenhauer.

You sit by a river on a sunny day, drowsy and relaxed, disinclined to
move or think. Gradually, you feel a lazy affection for the beings
surrounding you - dogs, birds, people, grass, flies, trees. It starts
pouring with rain, and you rapidly find the rosy mists of the monistic
feeling being replaced by the chill yet bracing wind of a pluralistic
interpretation of your experience.

Mr. Ellingham has taken me to task for being a "dogmatic pluralist".
I have failed to appreciate, for example, that the typewriter on which
I am producing this is, metaphysically, me, that everything, metaphysi-
cally, is me. If we were "really" discrete individuals, how could we
possibly communicate and interact? To which, at the risk of sounding
superficial, I simply reply, "Why not". Here, it seems to me, that
Ellingham is projecting his logical requirements onto the universe -
to be more specific, because it seems logically unacceptable (to him)
that separate beings can hear, see, taste, touch and (if they don't
use deodorant!) smell each other, he blandly concludes that such a
(pluralistic) state of affairs is cosmically impermissible - really,"All is One". One...what? If the "universe" is infinite (spatially
boundless), it cannot be one thing, since any "thing" can be
distinguished from other things. If there is only an infinito (i.e.,
uninterrupted, homogeneous) "reality" it is not distinguishable from
anything, since it is everything (all-encompassing). As a Buddhist
friend of mine once said: "If 'All is One', it is a non-numerical unity".
I offer that remark for Mr. Ellingham - "universe" is only a "sum-
total of things" word, nothing more. What, practically speaking, is the
difference between "All is One" and "All that exists, exists"?

If "one", why are there different opinions - ideas. why are all people not of one mind? J.Z.

Again, if everything "phenomenal" is actually a manifestation of
the "One", is the "One" conscious or unconscious, purposive or
purposeless? If there is some splendid "Absolute Mind", for example,
what in Hegel could have persuaded this eternally self-enclosed and
self-sufficient "Mind" to externalize itself as this miserable world -
how could this ultimate "Mind" tolerate even a moment of the vulnerable
consciousness belonging to limited, separate living entities? Thus,
if it is foolish to predicate any kind of awareness (individuality,
cognition) in this hypothetical "Ground of all Being", it becomes a
more amiless, inexorable force - nothing better. Far from the "universe"
resembling the expression of some impeccably spiritual "Oneness", it
just looks like...what it is: numberless beings, events, activities,
all relative, yet all unique. Can we really, except from a poetic
point of view with numerous reservations, talk about the non-difference
of the "One" and the "Many"? Even if this were true (though it can be
argued that such a statement is quite unintelligible) what kind of
"cutpurse" "One" is on offer in the showroom of monistic metaphysics?
Judging by the universe a "Oneness" which is simply insentient,
mindless, neither mind, spirit, nor urge - just force or stuff. That
is, I would submit, the most one could maintain on behalf of this "One"
which, for Ellingham, is the ground of "Being". If the monistic picture
of existence were a valid one, why can't we eradicate the sufferings
of others, why are others "closed" to us (since we cannot know their
subjectivity from the inside)? If we were "one" with the universe, this
could only mean that we were "one" with it in the sense that we are
"one" with "all" in deep, dreamless sleep. On the level and in the
dimension of consciousness - whether equivocal, unequivocal, or whatever
else you like to call it - we are a plurality of beings. Monism can
lead to pessimism as it can lead to optimism - think of Schopenhauer's
voluntarist monism in which we are all just suffering objectifications
of the one blind "Will". Far from seeing the world as a place which
merits our approval and admiration, he said it was such a grin, cruel
place that we should all stop breeding, thus allowing the race to
become extinct. How would this brand of monism strike our Francis, I
wonder?
If scientists discover new particles – so what? An infinite series of particles doesn’t support the idea of a “seamless” or “indivisible” cosmos, in which “things” are only conceptually distinguishable, not, as pluralists maintain, experientially distinguishable. And if it is still an open question whether pluralism or monism is “right”? Well, then, we must have recourse to the testimony of mysticism, according to Ellingham.

A number of mystics have strenuously denied the monistic theory of being. Orthodox Christian mystics have always detested pantheism, Jewish mystics have told us the relationship between man and “God” is one of eternal difference, and there have been many Hindu mystics who explicitly repudiated the “non-duality” doctrine of the great South Indian monistic philosopher Sri Sakarakacharya. In medieval Bengal, for example, there was the devotional mystic, Caitanya (“Gauranga”, the “Golden One”). His contemporary followers can be seen singing and dancing down a thoroughfare in the metropolis chanting “Hare Krishna”. He told his followers that to say the individual is one with the “Absolute” is lunacy and the spiritual equivalent of megalomania. In general, therefore, we cannot say that mystics are in favour of monism. Having regularly practiced meditation for many years, I have sometimes experienced states of serenity or “deepening” (for want of a more suggestive word). I have never felt I was being merged, dissolved or extinguished in the sea of “universon being”. I am of the opinion that mystics experience only themselves in their trances. Because their self is then extremely tranquil, it is as if their individuality were obliterated and “Oneness” established. As if......

To say “I am I” is not “trivial”. How astonishing that there is only one “Francis Ellingham” maintaining that we are all “one”! How astonishing that there is but a single “Scepticus” affirming that we are not! As for the “universe”, in the midst of its unconsciousness and impersonality, we find consciousness, personalities. Unfortunately, the word “universe” is misleading – John Cowper Powys replaced it with “multiverse”. Is there such a thing as “London”, for example, or (like “universe”) is this not a convenient “hold-all” of a word referring to an immense number of different things? (According to some cosmologists there may be many “universes” – all in different dimensions)

To conclude: I see no evidence that we are all “ultimately”, or “noumenally”, “one”. My sympathy can allow me to feel as if this were so, but this is an exceptional state, and it does not prove that the objectively real, varied cosmos is actually a unitary “spiritual” reality. Indeed, if you look at the fierce battles between microscopic monsters in one drop of water, monism seems about the most absurd idea possible! The fact that any living being is unquestionably finite, fallible, susceptible to suffering and subordinate to “Nature” is not exactly a proof of “oneness” with the “Absolute”. Absolutely.... not!

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CORRECTION

In a recent Minus One (No. 37, p. 8) you incorrectly describe my book, The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner, as “the off-shoot of a doctoral dissertation”. This book did not originate in a doctoral dissertation nor was it in any way based on a doctoral dissertation, but was in fact straightforwardly written as a book for publication, in complete freedom from the cramped conditions which can sometimes affect work done for a higher degree. I should be grateful if you would put the record straight.

R.W.K.Paterson.
THE STORY OF AN EGOIST OBJECTOR

It is the old cry of the conservative-minded that youthful rebels will "grow out of" their non-conformity and, indeed, many do. There are some, however, who do not "grow out of", but "grow into" it! One such is a veteran egoist of seventy-six who lives in one of the small towns that cluster around the borders of the London sprawl. For reasons of his own he wishes to remain anonymous so he will be known in this story as B.

B. was educated, if that is the word, in a Catholic Orphanage where whippings were frequent and the Christian teachers achieved the remarkable result of rendering him unable to read or write until, long after he was twenty one, he taught himself.

After serving as a soldier in World War 1 B. was unable to get a job. After a short time on the dole he was disqualified for further benefit despite there being two and a half million unemployed. Having "no means of support" he was sent to a "labour camp" in Surrey (shades of Hitler and Stalin!) which was under the authority of a former army major who had been in charge when it was a camp for German prisoners-of-war and still thought the inmates were prisoners-of-war - which, in a way, they were.

When World War 2 came along, therefore, it is not surprising that B. did not feel like fighting for a system that had treated him in such a manner. Not only this, but he had now come to understand the conscious egoism of Max Stirner and saw no point in sacrificing himself for the glory of the British State. So he became a "conscientious objector" to military service. Unlike other objectors, however, he refused to play the role of a defendant before the two government tribunals he faced. On the contrary, he took the offensive. His sheer effrontery paid off and he was exempted from service. The reason for this may well be found in the final part of his statement to the second tribunal which reads:

"If Hitler should win the war my struggle will still go on. But as for Churchill and his lick-spittle scum, he and they will readily adapt themselves to the new regime, and will, I am sure, be delighted to smartly click the heels of their jackboots and loudly shout "Mein Führer" and "Heil Hitler" repeatedly.

"You might ask, since there is a war going on, how can it be ended without the use of violence. Easy! Just tell all the sailors and soldiers, etc., on both sides that if they don't want to fight they can go home and the "heroes", with very few exceptions, will suck their tails between their legs and march off the battlefields! Yes, just as easy as that and you know it! It is governments alone who plan and organize wars, and are responsible for all the carnage that goes with it. Soldiers merely do their dirty work.

"Let me here hold you to you own maxim, to wit: where there is no written and signed agreement, there is no legal contract. I therefore demand that you show me a document, signed by my own hand, as proof that I have agreed to submit myself and be held accountable to any of your laws. And if you were to force me to sign such an agreement, it would still not be legally valid, even according to your own laws.

"If for some reason or other I should think fit to join one of your armed forces, I will do so with only one object in view, to wit: To carry out acts of sabotage and deliberately violate paragraph 531 and section 7 of the Army Act and also the "King's Rules and Regulations". It will therefore be at just such a time when you think I am to be
trusted, I will be in the most favourable position to strike at you.

"Nobody can represent me, nor are they qualified to examine or to understand my conscience. As far as I am concerned, the best advice I can give you is to leave me alone, for without you having me watched both day and night you would be lost. You can make whatever decision you like concerning me, but remember, it all depends on me! Mine is the final decision! FOR I AM THE UNIQUE ONE!"

In a footnote to his story B. comments:

"In the next war there will be no appeals. They will just send calling-up papers and the sheep will all report themselves for DUTY."

ENZO MARTUCCI - THE TRAGIC END.

Renzo Ferrari and S.E. Parker

From Renzo Ferrari has come news of the death on July 17, 1975, of Enzo Martucci (Enzo da Villafiore) at the age of 71. Born at Caserta (Naples) on March 20, 1904, Martucci became an anarchist at the age of 16 and ran away from his bourgeois home and studies. In his wanderings around Italy he met Renzo Novatore (Ricieri Abele Ferrari, an anarchist individualist, poet and illegalist who was killed in 1922 in a battle with the police) and from then on devoted himself to the advocacy of anarchist individualism. He was imprisoned by the fascist regime and its democratic successors. He wrote several books, including Pui Oltre (1947), La Bevanda dell' Anticristo (1950) and La Setta Rossa (1953, new edition 1969). From 1965 until the year before his death he issued his own paper, virtually written by himself. Each issue had a different title in order to evade the Italian printing laws. Several translations of his articles were published in MINUS ONE (among them the notable "In Defence of Stimmel") and a biographical article on him by Stephen Marletta appeared in No. 17, Jan-Feb. 1967.

Martucci had a strong and impetuous temperament and was a difficult person to get on with. All too often his writings digressed into attacks on people he believed to have wronged him and, like many individuals who have suffered real persecution, he tended to have a paranoidic attitude towards life. Nevertheless he had a first class mind and I, for one, profited from his ideas even when I disagreed with him. Two or three years before his death he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for reasons which he never divulged. After his release, he wrote to Stephen Marletta on January 8, 1974 announcing his intention of reviving his paper. This he did shortly afterwards, publishing one final issue with the title of La Ribellione. From then on nothing was heard from him. Why this was so may be found in the following account of his death by Renzo Ferrari, son of his friend and mentor Renzo Novatore:

I learned of his death by chance and it was not possible to find out in which way it came about. I know that he suffered from psoriasis, an illness that often tormented him, but I cannot say if this was the only cause. His life was always irregular, restless, assailed by the material needs of daily existence. Endowed with a vast culture, a profound and critical thinker, he could not but be against each and every-one. Nevertheless, profiting from his frequently desperate condition the Spider of the Church of Rome attempted by every means to catch him in its trap. He was invited to Assissi where, in the presence of authoritative priests, it sought to negotiate his conversion to Christianity in exchange for a comfortable living. There Martucci had
a moment of bewilderment and weakness. He wrote a book entitled Out of the Abyss that afterwards, recovering himself, he did not publish, but the manuscript of which fell into the hands of those who had ordered it. A Jesuit who had lent him money took the work as a pledge for the restitution of the loan. Martucci was unable to repay the loan and the manuscript was kept by him who had helped so Christianly. But here one would have to go into more detail and this, in a hastily written letter, is impossible. In brief, from that time Martucci, though continuing to struggle, could not free himself from their clever trap and remained there, I believe, until the end....

Martucci also believed too much in the disinterestedness of some Christian Democrats of the Italian government who appeared to pay him attention. Andreotti, the present President, when he was Minister of Defence, showed himself to be generous to the point of entrusting Martucci with the task of an enquiry into agrarian reform, putting all at his disposal: money and means! And so Martucci, the irreducible critic, finished up as a victim of Christian charity!

What did he do or propose as a land reformer? J.E.

With the late Renato Letini he had two daughters and a son. Under whose protection are they now? And his book, Il Diavolo Ha Vinto, for which he could never find a publisher, into whose hand has it fallen? These are questions I cannot answer because I do not know where to write for clarification and the one who told me of his death was unable to say much more. In Italy, anarchist individualist thought has now completely disappeared.......

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DOMENICO PASTORELLO

S.E.P.

"Madame Marie-Louise Pellegrini Pastorello a la doulceur de vous faire part du deces de Monsieur Domenico Pastorello survenu le 20 Decembre 1976, a l'age de 90 ans. L'incinération a eu lieu le 23 Decembre 1976."

Domenico Pastorello was one of the first contributors to MINUS ONE. Indeed, he was corresponding with me for about a year before the first issue in October 1963. Lively, provocative, contradictory, he kept on fighting to the end for his version of individualism. His own publisher, he sent a steady stream of pamphlets by himself and his wife all over the world "sans commerce". Vale Domenico! To Maria-Luisa - coraggio!

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ADDENDUM TO THE WILL TO BONDAGE

In the September, 1976, issue of "Cahiers des AMIS de Han Ryner," the editor writes: "We were happy to receive the booklets, LIBERTARIAN BROADSIDES, published by Ralph Myles. Regarding "Estienne de La Boetie: The Will to Bondage", (English) translation and French text of the "Discours de la Servitude Volontaire, with a critical and bibliographical study by Wm Flygare introduced by James J. Martin, Hen Day is listed in the bibliography but not Han Ryner. It must be noted that Han Ryner devoted a lecture to "La Boetie and Montaigne" in his "History of Individualism" at the Saint-Antoine University in 1907 ("The Cooperation of Ideas"). The Dialogues of Ahasverus, which were published in 1921, contains a dialogue between La Boetie and Ahasverus." Wm Flygare comments: "Like most people who make things, I am grateful for every little tip, especially when I consider where I live. My omission was not a matter of ignoring, it was a matter of ignorance."
The second issue of The Storm! A Journal For Free Spirits is now available from Mark A. Sullivan, 227 Columbus Ave. Apt.2E, New York, N.Y. 10023, USA. 55 cents single; 2 dollars.75 can' for six. Currently the only anarcho-individualists journal published in North America.

REVIEWS

(Cenza Crepuscolari by Renzo Ferrari. 46pp. Editrice Italia Letteraria, Milan, Italy. Lire 2,500)

From Italy a well produced book of poems. The verses are of a high lyrical standard, with some of a self-questioning nature. The author recently received the Silver Award of the International Academy of Fontez.

S.H.

(Anthology 76. The Ikuta Press, 1875-11, Kamnubayashi, Sumiyoshi-cho, Higashinada-ku, Kobe 658, Japan. 3dollas.50cents (US)

Poems by Yoko Demno, Wm. Flygare, Lindlay William Hubbell, Hiroaki Sato and Shigeki Yessamoto. Not so bright this time around this anthology is nonetheless still worth reading. I particularly liked "Self-Introduction" and "Winter Park"by Yoko Demno, and "Person to Person" and "The Meaning of a Name" by Wm Flygare.


Poems in praise of writers, artistes, musicians, singer and humourists who once inhabited Nonmartre "temple of the genial and studious Bohemia that has now disappeared like the Temple of Dionysos". Amongst those featured are Paul Verlaine, Johann Rictus, Hector Berlioz, Rodigiani, Utrillo, and Toulouse-Lautrec. Clearly of work of love by someone who knows Nonmartre and the Paris of which it is part.

S.E.P.

ENDPIECE

In Z Review No 3, an anarcho-literary-satirical review, (41 Norman Street, Leicester. 15p) MINUS ONE is described as an "agist occasional (what else do you expect?)" and complaint is made that it is "idiosyncratic and obscure; besides it never mentions us". Well, we're certainly "idiosyncratic" - "what else do you expect" agists to be? As for "being obscure", since no examples are given no clarification can be given in repurport. And as for "never mentioning us" - that goes for the majority of our exchanges. There is not the space to do this properly, but they do get a mention from time to time - such as this!

Ye Editor.